



Research

The Tax Treatment of Carried Interest

DOUGLAS HOLTZ-EAKIN, CAMERON MCCOSH, GORDON GRAY | JUNE 15, 2017

Introduction

The previous administration and Candidate Trump, as well as other policymakers have proposed to increase the taxation of “carried interest.” Carried interest is an integral feature of the financial arrangements of partnerships, a management structure broadly utilized in the United States and especially prominent in finance, insurance, and commercial real estate. This structure provides the general partners with a share of profits that is more than proportional to their capital contribution only if those general partners are successful in achieving the investment goals of the partnership. The business model permits entrepreneurs to match their expertise with a financial partner, assume risks, and align the parties’ economic interests so that entrepreneurial risk taking is viable.^[1]

This paper examines the impact of changing the tax treatment of carried interest. It begins by reviewing the current tax treatment and previously proposed changes to carried interest tax policy.^[2] Next, we turn to the extent and scale of partnership operations, and the range of impacts that higher taxes might deliver and follow this with analysis of the likely channels by which raising taxes on carried interest would affect the United States. The final section is a summary.

To anticipate the conclusions, increasing taxes on carried interest would constitute a potentially large tax increase on partnerships – especially in finance, insurance, and real estate – both in dollar terms and relative to the income generation of the affected partners. The specter of these tax implications will spawn reactions ranging from legal restructuring to crowding out valuable real economic transactions that are not sufficiently profitable to carry the additional burden. Perhaps most damaging, the higher taxes on carried interest will re-allocate managerial talent, as the entrepreneurially-inclined are deterred by these higher taxes and seek their outlets elsewhere in the economy.


The Tax Proposal

Many business ventures are organized as limited partnerships. Investors such as pension funds, endowments, foundations, individuals, and others contribute capital and become limited partners (LP) in the partnerships. One or more general partners (GP) provide entrepreneurial management of the partnership and are paid a management fee that is typically one to two percent of the overall partnership’s capital.

In a typical partnership, the GP also contributes capital alongside the investors’ capital. This ranges from 1-10 percent in most cases. The GP also receives an interest in the overall profits above the share allocable to his capital contribution. This interest is commonly referred to as a “promote,” “profits interest,” or “carried interest.” Typically, the carried interest is 20 percent of the profits and is generated from appreciation in the

value of the partnership's property. In the case of real estate, for example, this means that after a period of between five to 10 years, the GP receives a payoff linked to the degree to which the entrepreneurial input has resulted in higher asset prices.

Figure 1: Example Partnership Structure



The initial investment is provided by limited partners -- in this example \$10 million. The general partner invests no capital, but contributes entrepreneurial management to meet growth objectives. At sale, the general partner gets his or her share, usually 20 percent, and the rest is return on investment for the limited partners. The carried interest is the \$4 million provided to the general partner.

The carried interest provides powerful incentives to align the interests of the GP and the LPs. While the GP also receives a management fee that covers administrative overhead, operating costs, and managers' salaries, that fee is fixed and does not provide incentives to improve the performance of the real assets.

The management fees are taxed as ordinary income. The carried interest, however, is taxed at the time of sale. The tax character of the income is consistent with that distributed by the partnership. The sale of the partnership's real assets produces a long-term capital gain taxable at the capital gain rates (maximum 23.8 percent).

Changes to the taxation of carried interest were proposed and passed by the House of Representatives in 2010, but were not adopted into law. Successive budgets under the Obama administration have proposed taxing carried interest as ordinary income, rather than as a long-term capital gain (if the partnership income so qualifies). Congressional Democrats have recently reintroduced a similar proposal. As a candidate, now President Trump, also proposed taxing carried interest as ordinary income. Under current law, long-term capital gains are taxed at a rate of 23.8 percent – 20 percent capital gains rate as of January 2011 plus a 3.8 percent Medicare tax on investment income enacted as part of the Affordable Care Act. The top marginal income tax rate is 43.4 percent – 39.6 percent, plus the 3.8 percent Medicare surtax if applicable. Taxing carried interest as ordinary income would thus increase the tax rate from 23.8 percent to 43.4 percent, an 82 percent increase.

Principles of Taxation and Carried Interest

Proponents of this change argue that the tax treatment that the current tax treatment is “unfair” because it accords a particular form of GP compensation preferential tax treatment. They argue that the GP is providing services to the partnership and services are taxable as ordinary income.

How does this assertion compare to standard principles of tax policy? From an equity perspective, a greater unfairness inherent in the proposal is that it would cause similar taxpayers to be taxed differently. If enacted, investments in real assets would face different effective tax rates depending upon whether they are undertaken by an individual, C Corporation, or via the limited partnership structure.

Next, carried interest is not the same as other compensation. The carried interest is a *potential* share of partnership profits and not considered compensation for services by the partners –management and other annual fees constitute such compensation. These not insubstantial fees are taxed at ordinary income rates. They are based on the entire amount of partnership capital under management and paid annually by the partnership. The management fee is typically 2 percent of capital under management but can also include other fees like acquisition, development and leasing fees. If a partnership under-performs, they are the only income the general partner receives. Simply stating that the carried interest is compensation for services ignores the economic relationship of the partners in the partnership.

The tax change is potentially unfair from a third perspective as current proposals are not exclusively changes in the prospective treatment of carried interest. That is, they do not rule out retroactive tax increases on investments undertaken assuming that carried interests would be characterized as capital gains for tax purposes.

From an efficiency perspective, treating carried interest as ordinary income would not improve the U.S. tax code. First, differential taxation of capital income across sectors and business forms introduces inefficiencies in

the allocation of national wealth.

Second, the proposed treatment is inconsistent with both income tax principles and consumption tax principles. Consider the latter. There is now a wide consensus that fiscal policy in the United States must promote the most sustainable pace of long-term economic growth. As part of this, it is essential to keep taxes on the return to saving, investment, and entrepreneurial innovation as low as possible. Pro-growth tax reforms that focus on taxing consumption typically permit a full deduction from the tax base for all capital contributions to investments as the appropriate offset for taxing the future cash flow returns at a full rate. The proposed tax change on carried interest imposes the latter taxation, without the corresponding deduction and is, thus, inconsistent with a consumption tax base.

Similarly, it is inconsistent with a Haig-Simons income tax in which the appropriate base is the potential to consume during the tax year – i.e., the actual consumption plus any net saving. Under an income tax, the GP should be taxed on the basis of the expected increase in consumption in the year in which the project is begun.

In sum, from the perspective of tax policy, it is neither a genuine move toward more fairness in the current tax system nor a movement of the current system toward a more desirable overall tax code.

Impacts of Changing the Tax Treatment of Carried Interest

A straightforward approach to analyzing the impact of changing the tax treatment of carried interest begins noting that partnerships are a pervasive part of the economic landscape. Table 1 displays selected characteristics of partnerships using data for 2014 drawn from the Internal Revenue Service's *Statistics of Income* data series. The data indicates that there were roughly 3.61 million partnerships comprising over 27.7 million partners. These enterprises managed over \$26.13 trillion dollars in assets and generated net income of roughly \$837.4 billion. Clearly, substantially increasing the taxes on such a broad-based business structure will have potentially dramatic impacts on the economy.

Counted by number, partnerships are most prominent in real estate (50.3 percent), finance and insurance (9.3 percent) and retail trade (4.7 percent). Viewed from the perspective of total assets, the finance sector (56.4 percent) appears larger than real estate (21.6 percent).

Table 2 draws on the information in Table 1 and focuses attention on the potential magnitudes involved in changing the tax treatment of carried interests, with particular emphasis on the finance, insurance and real estate industries.^[3] Specifically, consider the first column that shows the economy-wide partnerships. It indicates that of the \$2.1 trillion in net income generated by partnerships, roughly \$822 billion is has the character that would potentially lead it to be classified as carried interest (the sum of “Net long-term capital gain” and “Net section 1231 gain”). To get a rough sense of magnitudes, we assume that 20 percent of this income flow is the share of general partners yields an *estimate of the income that might be subject to reclassification for tax purposes* – \$164 billion.

As shown in the bottom panel of the table, these data suggest that changing the tax treatment from a 23.8 percent tax rate to 43.4 percent increased total taxes from this source from \$39 billion to \$71 billion – a tax increase of \$32 billion.^[4]

Item	All industries	Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting	Mining	Utilities	Construction	Manufacturing	Wholesale trade	Retail trade	Transportation and warehousing	Information	Finance and insurance	Real estate and rental and leasing	Real estate		Professional, scientific, and technical services	Management of companies (holding companies)	Administrative and support and waste management and remediation services	Educational services	Health care and social assistance	Arts, entertainment, and recreation	Accommodation and food services	Other services
													Real estate	Lessors of nonresidential								
Number of partnerships	3,811,255	143,516	31,489	5,046	142,832	66,775	82,382	188,827	46,650	42,168	334,546	1,016,888	1,781,949	726,353	219,788	32,717	66,433	20,821	85,027	73,874	138,213	85,640
Number of partners	27,714,478	456,700	2,536,857	163,581	412,324	836,815	815,366	680,347	3,119,120	173,729	6,634,114	7,887,184	7,577,856	2,880,874	810,461	1,338,133	167,211	68,882	374,489	473,766	516,684	279,982
Total assets	26,128,833,308	219,475,999	638,591,010	389,291,342	215,363,433	836,928,696	280,842,380	211,986,157	571,533,181	763,718,792	14,738,586,412	5,836,547,190	5,481,686,874	2,654,212,210	254,070,855	780,293,151	91,123,882	6,013,630	162,530,713	127,770,151	252,088,086	25,085,711
Total income	5,683,166,689	47,348,589	228,881,091	288,783,791	272,553,169	1,162,673,838	675,283,853	570,423,161	258,524,246	358,163,480	415,580,870	184,786,058	144,558,087	15,910,883	473,981,587	38,219,266	123,329,687	6,730,946	270,845,415	78,916,678	203,175,747	33,662,748
Business receipts	5,185,510,381	33,868,702	208,565,314	281,911,133	265,815,376	1,141,682,488	668,882,347	557,282,959	238,159,457	338,726,484	238,389,140	158,321,821	114,682,678	11,131,016	458,769,722	19,489,531	111,828,680	6,651,381	252,982,046	68,637,154	196,872,896	33,077,438
Ordinary income from other partnerships and fiduciaries	145,221,683	1,180,882	8,642,278	4,574,814	1,176,949	5,855,423	1,557,345	1,238,885	5,788,542	13,958,773	58,880,889	12,748,143	12,382,488	2,158,346	5,879,884	14,738,987	1,362,141	* 38,187	2,986,453	2,986,283	1,731,152	* 81,942
Farm net profit	11,103,632	10,857,707	* 2,328	0	* 7,855	* 3,248	* 369	0	* 854	0	* 33,465	187,684	186,101	* 35,888	0	* 10,746	0	0	0	0	* 176	0
Net gain, noncapital assets	26,841,882	1,514,338	4,712,157	411,438	340,411	1,180,475	785,951	413,622	1,494,582	1,598,942	6,723,331	4,885,653	3,101,583	722,988	289,885	1,252,295	49,086	* 7,770	240,588	287,382	535,823	178,716
Other income	234,488,152	716,880	6,188,514	1,888,488	5,113,377	13,832,203	4,876,480	11,586,884	5,881,881	3,888,381	113,743,828	16,812,558	14,245,385	1,883,283	11,813,827	3,815,788	10,881,720	32,888	13,828,327	6,985,938	4,847,381	324,653
Total deductions	5,162,584,842	42,184,236	170,680,277	213,343,878	288,188,818	1,115,887,843	657,787,888	558,318,378	247,536,581	388,088,527	333,881,586	188,288,158	134,645,816	14,917,374	382,747,404	32,118,817	116,628,938	6,888,988	237,237,738	76,882,887	199,911,826	32,123,786
Salaries and wages	541,453,888	2,738,882	7,775,818	2,887,588	10,142,388	32,573,848	25,822,381	38,288,528	11,527,555	28,138,888	88,187,888	18,873,168	15,445,488	1,234,182	115,882,435	4,883,875	27,888,787	1,984,188	78,151,888	28,355,488	37,228,446	5,918,722
Portfolio income (loss) distributed directly to partners	1,888,588,885	3,987,887	10,735,812	1,881,882	1,317,813	16,127,812	2,431,478	1,438,753	2,753,114	8,146,918	981,873,882	74,887,822	68,184,378	22,486,884	6,372,329	37,582,197	1,845,155	78,488	2,473,836	2,944,884	912,783	223,458
Interest income	153,885,358	688,558	783,216	272,285	384,373	3,818,515	223,888	344,235	518,855	3,518,878	122,887,187	12,875,888	12,887,835	4,282,975	1,885,187	5,888,787	318,712	1,787	528,816	313,775	288,748	18,888
Dividend income	182,729,221	488,272	688,383	25,823	282,576	4,227,126	488,388	81,788	1,255,825	528,863	134,147,777	18,284,888	18,131,884	3,478,887	432,288	9,835,848	87,288	* 478	18,134	87,874	147,188	42,872
Royalties	34,711,382	1,826,442	6,188,318	4,244	475	6,883,878	78,353	9,372	* 43,183	1,454,884	9,811,887	7,128,481	1,827,585	155,123	1,828,288	934,187	124,813	* 48,635	* 55,826	232,488	188,881	5
Net short-term capital gain (loss)	68,858,388	7,888	-53,272	4,885	141,887	38,432	-1,219	12,873	4,734	388,888	57,855,473	6,584,788	6,488,874	5,183,282	-88,884	1,885,823	-7,551	* 283	68,738	18,352	6,145	* 351
Net long-term capital gain (loss)	858,272,836	1,818,818	3,288,157	1,385,588	578,882	2,811,781	1,343,885	1,818,787	988,597	2,284,388	577,321,877	38,154,438	37,478,488	9,415,888	3,872,838	28,788,831	542,713	* 18,288	1,884,822	2,381,854	282,888	188,533
Net rental real estate income (loss)	42,841,847	488,365	-187,817	1,258	-184,888	38,781	75,526	256,228	-88,878	35,888	-3,872,464	44,187,872	43,881,476	53,288,888	248,381	428,428	-27,348	* 2,882	118,887	74,948	13,881	26,888
Net income	137,827,541	478,811	87,356	1,331	219,861	48,171	188,188	288,652	188,311	37,338	3,284,327	131,173,174	138,814,138	85,515,834	385,829	923,778	47,518	* 12,942	285,485	182,341	288,885	51,783
Loss	94,885,584	68,846	284,373	* 81	384,451	8,388	33,588	28,425	* 188,888	2,322	5,858,781	88,875,282	88,852,888	32,248,148	58,328	484,558	74,886	* 18,888	177,388	27,383	277,484	* 25,818
Other net rental income (loss)	2,782,458	98,733	184,811	-883,518	33,416	733,485	88,782	42,488	-118,311	-221,573	835,738	1,488,381	387,228	-81,888	18,165	6,851	21,588	* 78	68,965	53,235	188,888	* 13,818
Net income	7,948,916	184,888	118,387	37,348	35,114	734,916	181,148	58,563	218,218	458,748	1,257,353	4,288,338	889,716	228,388	88,811	154,885	28,353	* 78	188,346	53,875	* 188,588	* 13,818
Loss	5,187,457	* 4,928	* 5,576	* 648,887	* 1,658	1,518	* 2,384	16,885	328,529	688,313	421,823	2,818,837	582,486	318,458	78,846	147,944	* 4,388	0	* 48,381	648	* 551	0
Total net income (loss) [1]	837,442,914	8,458,642	64,982,434	-4,888,377	12,881,182	81,658,788	18,488,285	11,818,881	4,884,848	55,488,912	348,358,782	91,411,787	78,287,278	62,888,648	83,888,525	22,288,863	7,284,283	-75,218	33,584,914	2,785,853	4,887,118	1,641,321
Net income	1,158,121,917	16,288,782	83,211,549	18,728,548	18,881,154	88,877,488	24,788,281	18,684,481	22,883,835	67,428,875	385,813,816	188,883,822	188,845,871	95,485,843	185,782,884	31,278,537	11,812,741	758,744	48,283,434	18,848,488	14,785,882	3,252,945
Loss	318,679,184	7,758,148	18,388,215	15,588,823	6,118,882	19,218,799	6,282,816	6,885,648	18,288,587	11,858,163	48,254,234	188,282,125	182,548,412	33,428,883	11,882,459	8,878,574	3,888,458	833,854	6,888,528	7,244,887	18,778,871	1,611,635

*Estimate should be used with caution because of the small number of sample returns on which it is based.

income, royalties, and rental real estate income (loss) and other net rental income (loss). For more information, see Explanation of Selected Terms for total net income (loss) at the end of this article.

[2] Between \$500 and \$500.

NOTE: Don't include net add to total because of rounding.

Sources: IRS, Statistics of Income Division, Partnerships, April 2016.

Table 2.Static Implications of Changing the Taxation of Carried Interests, Tax Year 2014 (In thousands of US dollars)

Item	All industries	Finance and insurance	Real Estate and Rental Leasing
AVAILABLE FOR ALLOCATION			
Number of partnerships	3,600,578	334,217	1,812,052
Number of partners	27,676,214	6,629,727	7,870,354
Total income (loss)	2,124,196,201	1,311,342,538	260,269,210
Ordinary business income (loss)	440,572,628	81,598,884	15,475,907
Net rental real estate income (loss)	42,841,947	-2,672,464	44,197,972
Net long-term capital gain (loss)	659,272,636	577,321,877	38,154,436
PLUS Net Internal Revenue Code section 1231 gain (loss)	163,129,481	23,669,330	107,572,333
EQUALS Total Income at risk to higher tax	822,402,117	600,991,207	145,726,769
20% EQUALS Potential Carried Interest Basis	164,480,423	120,198,241	29,145,354
Total deductions	401,676,126	219,813,896	32,159,702
Total income (loss) minus total deductions available for	1,722,520,075	1,091,528,642	228,109,508
Net Income allocated to all partners	1,699,031,602	1,069,886,641	227,743,855
Limited Parters	1,381,961,512	910,083,514	188,129,519
Individual general partners	86,576,972	10,495,447	14,885,752
Partnership general partners	121,298,829	100,693,640	7,788,379
Nominee and all other partners	155,466,241	114,750,181	28,202,347
Taxation of Carried Interest			
Tax on Carried Interest at 23.8% rate	39,146,341	28,607,181	6,936,594
Tax on Carried Interest at 43.4% rate	71,384,504	52,166,037	12,649,084
Increase tax - carried interest of general partners	32,238,163	23,558,855	5,712,489
Tax Increase: % Income of Individual general partners	37%	224%	38%
Tax Increase: % Income of Individual & Partnership gen. part.	16%	21%	25%

An alternative metric is to examine the increased taxes as a fraction of the underlying partners' incomes. As shown at the bottom of Table 2, overall the tax increase is 37 percent of the individual general partners' income and 16 percent of combined income of individual and partnership general partners. The average tax rates are even more striking in finance and insurance, where the static implications are that over 224 percent of individual general partners' incomes would be required to match the taxes. For real estate, the rates range from 38 percent to 25 percent.

It is important to emphasize that these computations are not a "revenue estimate" because they assume no change in the underlying behavior. Given the magnitudes involved, the absence of reaction is implausible unless the law precludes the ability to adjust to the new tax environment. We turn now to the ability and nature of such responses.

The "Retroactive" Components of Higher Carried Interest Taxation.

Because these estimates are built off historical data and assume that there is no change in partnership behavior, they serve as a rough guide to the impact of a change in the tax treatment of carried interests if those impacts are

confined to existing partnerships. If, for example, the higher tax was imposed retroactively and exclusively on existing partnerships, the partnership contractual arrangements would be fixed and GPs would be forced to absorb these increased taxes without an avenue to minimize their impacts.

Importantly, the past proposals did not rule out retroactive taxation of existing partnerships. Thus, in the absence of change in the legislation, the impact of increasing taxes on carried interests will include at least in part these considerations.

The “Prospective” Component of Higher Carried Interest Taxation.

Going forward, however, there will be efforts to restructure partnerships in response to the new, higher level of taxation. Significant additional time and capital will be spent by finance, insurance, and real estate LPs and GPs in order to re-structure their investment vehicles so that the overall impact of the new tax on carried interests can be minimized or avoided altogether.

By definition, these new legal arrangements will be inferior to the original.^[6] Thus, this outlay and use of time will not improve economic performance overall, and will not contribute to the objectives of investment managers’, their institutional investors (such as pension funds) and their individual clients. Indeed, if at all possible, the GPs will have the incentive to pass these higher costs to the institutional investors and individual clients, thereby reducing their received rate of return.

A related avenue of adjustment would be to replace the incentive-based carried-interests structure between GPs and their investors with non-contingent, fixed compensation arrangements. Because of the absence of performance incentives, these types of compensation contracts will not elicit superior investment performance, with a declining return to investment as a result. Moreover, depending upon the nature of these arrangements, they may raise little revenue as the taxed compensation to the GPs will be deductible to individual and corporate investors.^[7]

However, it is unlikely that legal adjustments alone will be sufficient to avoid the entire tax. If so, the real economic activity will be affected. Intuitively, placing a greater tax burden on carried interests will raise the overall tax burden on the investment. Unless the project is sufficiently profitable, it will not be possible to pay the annual operating expenses, cover depreciation of the property, meet the contractual obligations for debt-financings, pay taxes, *and* offer a competitive return to the equity partners in the investment.

In such circumstances, the projects that don’t make the cut will be dropped – projects that likely will be in the more marginal locations or burdened with greater risk. In modern, competitive global financial markets, even small changes in margins move trillions of dollars of financial capital; the taxed partnerships would be at a clear financial disadvantage and would lose capital to other investment opportunities.

This impact – the shifting of capital from one sector of the economy to another in response to a discriminatorily higher tax – has been extensively analyzed in the context of the corporation income tax, beginning with Harberger (1966). The analogy is quite clear: the corporation income tax is a tax on the return to capital that is received through a particular business form – the chapter C corporation. Raising taxes on carried interest is a tax on the return to capital that is received through a particular business form – the partnership. The legal setting is different, but the economics are the same.

One dimension to the “cost” of the discriminatory taxation of carried interests is that capital is shifted to less productive uses; damaging overall economic performance. The intuition is straightforward. For simplicity, imagine that there is no tax (or equal tax treatment) across all uses of capital, and all returns are equalized at a pre-tax return of 20 percent. Now, suppose that one sector (partnerships) faces a unique and higher tax – to make the example simple – of 50 percent. Immediately, the post-tax return falls to 10 percent in this sector, inferior to opportunities of 20 percent elsewhere and capital flows to those opportunities.

The process will continue until post-tax rates of return equalize and eliminate incentives for capital shift. In this example, when pre-tax returns in the taxed sector are 30 percent and those in the less-taxed sector are 15 percent, the post-tax return will be 15 percent in both. The tax, however, generates a clear cost to the economy: capital is twice as productive (30 versus 15 percent) in the taxed sector as elsewhere. By driving capital from more productive to less productive activities, the tax reduces overall productivity of capital and shrinks the economy.

The Loss of Entrepreneurial Talent.

The Harberger analysis focuses exclusively on the shifting of capital. More recent research by Gravelle and Kotlikoff (1989), however, suggests that this approach badly understates the detrimental impacts of higher taxes because it has too narrow a focus. Specifically, Gravelle and Kotlikoff reconsider the computations and incorporate the fact that canceling investment projects alone are not the only fallout of raising taxes. Rather, when taxes are raised they also drive away the key element of economic success – entrepreneurial talent.

More specifically, taxed (partnerships) and untaxed (real estate investment trusts, etc.) business forms are competing for the same entrepreneurial management talent and producing the same ultimate product (investment services). Common sense suggests that the imposition of the additional tax on carried interests will diminish not only the ability to attract capital, but also the same quality of managerial talent to make the capital productive in partnerships. The prospect of lower after-tax pay will lead prospective investment managers to examine other employment options in the market. Inevitably, the lower quality management will diminish performance. Gravelle and Kotlikoff compare the efficiency cost apparent from the standard Harberger analysis with an efficiency cost that captures the loss of entrepreneurial talent. Over a wide range of assumptions about the nature of production and competition, the costs are at least 10 times as great and as much as 25 times higher.

These results suggest that the economic costs of crowding out partnerships projects plus the lower performance that comes from diminished entrepreneurial zeal will impair the economy as a whole. These economic costs represent foregone income in the economy – a loss for everyone.

Summary and Conclusion

There appears to be little merit to changing the tax treatment of carried interests. As indicated in an analysis by Michael Knoll (2007), taxing the carried interest will raise modest amounts of revenue.^[8] In return, the tax would likely inflict large damage on the commercial real estate sector, diminish its entrepreneurial talent pool, and lead to lower construction and wages in the real estate sector.

References

Bulan, Laarni, Christopher Mayer, and C. Tsurriel Somerville, “Irreversible Investment, Real Options, and Competition: Evidence from Real Estate Development,” Brandeis University, 2004. (Good)

Gravelle, Jane and Laurence Kotlikoff, “The Incidence and Efficiency Costs of Corporate Taxation When Corporate and Noncorporate Firms Produce the Same Good,” *Journal of Political Economy*, 1989. (Good)

Harberger, Arnold, “The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax,” *Journal of Political Economy*, 1962. (Good)

Harberger, Arnold, “Efficiency Effects of Taxes on Income from Capital,” in *Effects of the Corporation Income Tax*, M. Krzyzaniak (ed.), Wayne State University Press, 1966. (Could not find a direct link to it online to check, but when it is referenced in other papers, it is referenced in the same context. Good)

Hassett, Kevin and Aparna Mathur, “Taxes and Wages,” American Enterprise Institute, Working Paper #128, 2006. (Good)

Knoll, Michael S. “The Taxation of Private Equity Carried Interests: Estimating the Revenue Effects of Taxing Profit Interests as Ordinary Income,” unpublished, University of Pennsylvania, 2007. (Good)

- [1] This paper updates, Holtz-Eakin, Smith, and Stoody, “The Tax Treatment of Carried Interest,” June 10, 2010; Dante Bucci provided excellent research assistance
- [2] This examines carried interest proposals compared to current law, notwithstanding efforts at comprehensive tax reform in the Congress
- [3] The data in Table 2 are restricted to those returns that permit the allocation of income to partners, a crucial consideration as the tax treatment of carried interests is focused on general partners.
- [4] Fully phased in 2011 law in 2013, made the tax rate 39.6 percent.
- [5] Might need a new footnote because the reasons might have changed as to why there was a lower increase in revenue
- [6] If they were better, they would have been adopted in the absence of the new tax.
- [7] Not all investors are taxable; e.g., pension funds so there will not be a perfect offset. At the same time, the overall dollar value of compensation will have to exceed the existing carried interest to compensate GPs for their higher level of taxation. Knoll (2007) makes this argument.
- [8] His analysis is probably an overestimate. Knoll computes the cash value of an option contract that mimics carried interest for general partners, and calculates the additional taxes that would be collected by taxing this cash grant as ordinary income. In his analysis, this represents the additional payments that limited partners would be required to offer in order to retain sufficient inducement to attract general partnership talent. Another perspective on this analysis, however, is to note that he employs a conventional formula for valuation that assumes independent freedom to exercise the option and deep, liquid markets for the underlying asset. In the context of some investments, these likely overstate the reality and thus the value of the option.