

Carlo Salerno, Chad A. Miller, Doudou Zhang January 2016

Executive Summary

In his 2015 State of the Union address, President Obama announced a <u>\$60 billion</u> <u>initiative</u> to provide students with two years of free community college. The program would require states to opt in and commit 25 percent of the necessary funding. Schools receiving funding would be required to adopt evidence-based reforms to improve student outcomes as well as create programs that provide occupational training or fulfill transfer requirements to 4-year colleges and universities. In return, the federal government would pick up the remaining 75 percent of funding for tuition and fees.

In this paper, the American Action Forum (AAF) examines the impact of "free college" proposals on students, states, and taxpayers. Highlights of the key findings include:

- Only one out of three college students in the United States would be eligible to participate.
- Over a quarter of college students would be prevented from accessing a public federal relief program because the program doesn't allow students at private nonprofit and for-profit institutions to participate.
- Annual state spending would need to increase by approximately 5 to 13 percent in order to meet the contribution to be eligible to receive federal matching funds.
- The total annual additional cost to states would be \$3.7 billion to \$4.1 billion.
- Approximately 60 percent or \$48 billion of the \$80 billion combined federal and state investment for President Obama's proposed free college program would go to individuals that are unlikely to ever earn a college credential.



Introduction

Efforts to provide "free" postsecondary training are not new. The State of Indiana, for example, started their <u>21st Century Scholars program</u> nearly 25 years ago and Princeton launched a no-loans financial aid policy as early as 1998. These efforts from a mix of states, institutions and private providers have, however, only served small student populations.

Today there are a number of proposals to make the first couple years of college free. Like the president's initiative, these proposals do not fully cover the cost of attendance, just tuition and fees. They typically ask states to provide funding commitments and meet "maintenance of effort" conditions. In the small number of state-level pilots that exist, these efforts have also been structured as "last dollar" programs.ⁱ Free in this context isn't about driving down the cost of providing education to zero but instead shifting who directly shoulders the burden of paying for higher education away from students and families and onto taxpayers.

A balanced policy discussion on these proposals needs to consider tradeoffs and costs. Not every student would benefit from proposals like these and not every state will be willing or able to participate. Where public resources are scarce, the fact that so many students start college but never finish raises important questions about whether existing funding could be more efficiently allocated to achieve more favorable outcomes.

Not All Students Win

Current estimates place the total college-going population in the United States at around 21 million, with about 15 million or some 72 percent of those students enrolled in public institutions.ⁱⁱ Since free college proposals would not apply to students enrolled in private higher education programs, more than one in four college-going students would automatically be prevented from accessing any form of tuition relief. Of those enrolled at public institutions about 6.8 million, or roughly 45 percent are enrolled in two-year community colleges, which means that the president's proposal would effectively only benefit approximately one out of every three college students in the United States.

The impact of state- versus student-targeted aid is stark as those institutions where students would be ineligible to benefit from the president's proposal serve a large percentage of the nation's financially needy students. Just more than 30 percent of Pell recipients attend public four-year colleges and universities while another 33 percent of Pell recipients are enrolled at private non-profit and for-profit institutions.ⁱⁱⁱ

Why Push Students Towards Community Colleges?

The president's proposal allocates taxpayer dollars toward one of the worstperforming sectors of American higher education. It also seeks to drive enrollment into what is already American higher education's largest sub-sector.

Community college participants not only represent the group with the highest unemployment rates (amongst individuals with a college education) but their earnings are lowest amongst all individuals having a post-high school credential as shown in the chart below. They represent the largest group of students who begin college but never complete a degree; some estimate that 48.8 percent of all students at two-year public community colleges have not completed a degree and are not enrolled at another institution 6 years later.^{iv} As a sector these students also have the highest propensity to default on their federal student loan debt.^v




Chart 1: Earnings and Unemployment Rates by Educational Attainment

Source: Bureau of Labor and Statistics


The Cost of State (Lack of) Participationvi

The president's proposal is structured as a matched investment including an additional commitment to making and sustaining appropriate funding increases. The annual cost of anticipated state investment varies substantially, from as low as \$7.4 million in Vermont to more than \$349 million in New York (see Chart 2). At a minimum, the incremental one-year additional cost for all states would be approximately \$3.7 billion.^{vii} This does not take into account tuition increases nor does it address the potential for students not currently in the higher education market to enroll in community colleges or for students at 4-year institutions to shift

to community college education. Under very simple assumptions^{viii} the collective annual cost to states could easily reach \$4.1 billion.

Pairing these minimum additional commitments with existing annual state appropriations for higher education^{ix} suggests that the average state would need to increase its annual higher education appropriations by 5.1 percent to 5.7 percent to cover states' shares of the proposal's match requirement. Across individual states those percentages vary from as low as 2.1 percent in Montana to 12.4 percent in New Hampshire.

Chart 2: Baseline Estimate of State Costs & Percentage of Budget Increase Needed to Cover Costs



Source: AAF Analysis (See Appendix 1)

States must be fiscally capable of making such investments but they must also be willing to participate in this program, which currently has yet-to-be-defined performance standards. Any standards will require additional regulatory costs and also impose new levels of administrative and reporting burden on states and institutions. In either case the incentive grant structure means that different levels of state participation will impact the eligible college-going population differently. For example, just four states enroll one-third of all public college students (California, New York, Texas and Florida) and half of all public community college students come from just seven states. California alone enrolls approximately one out of every five community college students in the United States. Given that states, not students, initially determine participation levels, for one or more of the "Big Four" states above to either be unwilling or unable to meet the incentive grant requirements the result





would be making anywhere from 200,000 to 1.6 million students ineligible for the proposed public subsidy.

The ability to both inject and sustain additional resource commitments into public higher education will depend in part on individual states' public priorities, notably health care and pensions commitments. Despite the last recession ending almost five years ago and a number of states having experienced budget surpluses in recent years, declines in state higher education investment continues to persist. Between 2008 and 2015, 31 states cut per-student funding by more than 20 percent, and 6 states cut funding by more than one-third.x

Proposals for free college are specifically expected to offset such declines by creating matching federal investments; however, it is unclear to what extent capacity for such investments exists. Up to 16 states are expected to run deficits in the next year or two years. In some states with sizeable public higher education systems like Illinois, Maryland, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania, stateg budget deficits are expected to run between \$750 million and \$6 billion.xi

Chart 3 plots state 2- and 4-year enrollments against George Mason University's Mercatus Center index of states' fiscal health.xii The bottom five states in particular are classified by the Center as being in "financial peril" based on high deficits and unfunded debt obligations. If one assumes that the bottom quintile was financially unable to meet the matching fund requirements, more than 1.6 million community college students in these states would find themselves ineligible for relief provided by the president's proposal.






Note: Based on FTE fall enrollments.

Source: NCES, Digest of Education Statistics 2013, Table 307.20.; Mercatus Center at George Mason University

State willingness to participate may also be affected by college graduates' migration patterns. Unlike other infrastructure investments, such as highways, human capital does not have to remain within the state where it was created. As Figure 1 shows, hundreds of thousands of students with either some college or associates degrees annually move to different states.





Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2014 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates

Finally, evidence supporting the success of higher education programs of this type is thin and is more apt to suggest states generally struggle to meet federal eligibility conditions. The U.S. Government Accountability Office published a report in December 2014 on state and federal programs to improve college affordability that was only able to identify three federal/state incentive-style programs. Of these, the one closest in structure to free college proposals, the College Access Challenge Grant Program, appropriated \$142 million in 2013 (the last year of the program) but only ended up spending half of the money because not all of the states were able to meet the maintenance of effort conditions required for the funding.^{xiii}

The Taxpayer Cost of Funding Access Versus Completion

In general, federal investments in higher education are made in an effort to increase the degrees and credentials needed to ensure a productive workforce with lower unemployment rates, higher wages, and economic growth. By definition free college proposals improve access to higher education but more students does not equate to more degrees granted, which yield the kinds of wage gains consumers seek or the tax and productivity gains that governments expect to realize.^{xiv} The lack of evidence or support for improving completion has been a common refrain amongst both economists and pundits.^{xv}





Source: National Student Clearinghouse Research Center

In fact, in November of 2014, just two months before the president unveiled his plan, the National Student Clearinghouse released an <u>in-depth study</u> that students at the public 2-year colleges at the heart of the president's plan are highly unlikely to earn a degree or credential (see Chart 4).

As the chart shows, after six years only about 39 percent of public community college students end up completing a degree.^{xvi} This means that the president's free college proposal would effectively be spending \$36 billion of a \$60 billion investment on up to 5.4 million students who will likely never receive any type of college credential. Add the share of the \$20 billion that states would be required to



invest on top of the federal match and the total potential loss on an \$80 billion federal and state investment could be close to \$48 billion.

A full accounting of the economic costs is difficult to produce, especially given the migration of students from 2- to 4-year institutions. Still, research from the American Institutes of Research found that between 2004 and 2008 almost \$4 billion in federal and state taxpayer monies through grants and appropriations went to community college students who dropped out after just one year of study.xvii

It's important to note that the federal taxpayer's \$60 billion investment is not directed towards student services such as remedial support or counseling or even childcare. This proposal quite plainly provides grant dollars to students regardless of whether they actually receive a degree. It provides aid whether the student is part of a family of four that lives below the poverty line or are part of a family that makes \$200,000 per year.

Addressing the Real Challenge

The easiest way to understand the challenges to the president's free community college proposal is to compare it to additional investment in, for example, existing federal programs designed to foster affordability like the Pell grant.

If getting individuals to complete and reap the benefits of advanced education is what matters, it is unclear why a policy should care which entity provides the service. In comparison to Pell, state-based grants or allocations to institutions must, by design, curtail access since individuals do not dictate initial eligibility. It also raises the practical question of why students who by virtue of being born and living in states that are unwilling or unable to make these kinds of investments should not be the beneficiaries of federal subsidies? Under what circumstances should a federal policy prevent a poor, yet academically talented individual in one state from obtaining affordable higher education while financially assisting wealthier individuals in other states?

As many critics have already noted, free community college ends up subsidizing some individuals for whom higher education may already be affordable. Yet it also works against efforts to redress problems associated with <u>under-matching</u>: the idea that qualified students from less-affluent households do not end up pursuing degrees in competitive colleges and instead enroll in less-selective or two-year community colleges. In either of these circumstances proponents need to be able to articulate why a free community college run via state-based incentive grant programs would be more efficient or effective at improving affordability, access or completion than Pell grants.

The under-matching issue is particularly salient because it means the free college concept is basically at odds with existing federal education policy. For years Congress

AAF

and the Department of Education have pursued efforts to facilitate and improve consumer choice. They have stressed the need for cost calculators and ratings systems so that people can make decisions that best fit their unique circumstances. They have encouraged shopping for schools and programs and to be mindful of things like graduation and attrition rates and to make academic major and career decisions based on wages and future employment prospects. They have brought under- and over-matching into the national policy debate and actively sought ways to help students avoid making college-going decisions based on what costs the least and instead on where their skills and talents fit best.

And yet free community college proposals effectively throw nearly all of this by the wayside with incentives for students to enroll in institutions with the highest attrition rates, some of the lowest wage curves and the greatest unemployment variability of any post-high school training institution. They make cost the main driver of the educational investment decision, without placing any downward pressure on the cost of college. They effectively place a financial penalty on millions of poor students for choosing a 4-year public or private option that may be a better fit for their capabilities, increase their chances of graduating, and produce hundreds of thousands of dollars in additional lifetime earnings.

As policy goes, promoting choice while financially encouraging participation in a single sub-sector sends consumers mixed signals. It also creates economic inefficiencies by giving free college to students at one institution type and without regard for what they're studying that risks an overflow of students in programs that labor markets neither need nor want. Here again proponents of free community college have not done a clear enough job of explaining why an alternative such as investing more dollars into an existing program like Pell grants cannot achieve similar outcomes while also being more consistent with current federal strategy.

At the state level, the obvious obstacle is that states most capable of even meeting the conditions necessary to receive matching federal funds will be those who are likely to need it the least. As Figure 2 showed earlier, the financially healthiest states almost exclusively service small community college populations and already provide substantial public subsidies. The states that need the dollars the most, the ones where economic investment can – over the long run – foster a larger, more stable revenue base, will find it most difficult to secure the investment dollars and maintain those levels over time.

In this regard, a state-based incentive grant feels like a policy that actually promotes gaps between the haves and the have-nots. If the federal government announced a program where families that agreed to make sustained investments in their children's higher education would have the balance of their tuition and fees paid for, it would immediately be met with derision as a tool that assists the wealthy at the expense of the poor. Enacting similar policy at the state level is not very different.^{xviii}

The idea behind free community college is that states and institutions are supposed to make the kinds of investments that will eventually lead to the kinds of structural changes to higher education that students, families and policymakers all seek: lowercost education programs and higher completion rates. There is, unfortunately, no evidence or logical support for the idea that free community college "bends the cost curve" or provides states making substantial financial commitments with assurance or incentives that completion rates will rise as a result.

Conclusion

While proposals to make community college free continue to attract attention, these proposals are expensive and fail to help students in need. Additionally, these proposals require states to make investments that they've shown a great deal of reluctance committing to while offering no promise or guarantee of a return on the money spent.

There is strong public agreement that policymakers need to develop new ways of promoting higher education completion and build new tools that will help students, institutions, and government manage college affordability. Every option should be weighed through a balanced assessment of the extent to which it meets the needs of all parties that it may affect, the costs on taxpayers, and its impact on affordability.

_	· _		1		-	-	<u> </u>		<u> </u>						_										-		1 1	1			1		1			1	—	-	1	1	_	_	—	
	Percent Increase in State Fiscal Support Based on AASC	4.2%	0.0%	7.9%	3.3%	2.7%	3.2%	3.5%	5.5%	3.5%	3.3%	3,8%	4.7%	8.5%	4.6%	5.4%	4.3%	3.7%	4.9% 6.5%	6.7%	7.7%	4.1%	5.7%	2.1%	2.7%	12,4%	6.6%	2.4%	0.6% 2.4%	2.1%	7.2%	3.8%	12.0%	6 102	8 3%	4.8%	3.6%	3.4%	2.9%	8.0%	7.3%	8.6% 3.2%	7.0%	2.7%
	State Fiscal Support for Higher Education FY2014	1,441,862,304	384,666,000	880,468,000	1,001,496,233	10,535,904,000	6/9,462,447	227,606,200	3,925,291,451	2,790,040,144	530,388,306 274 642 100	3/4,042,100 A non are son	1,695,683,480	823,333,019	771,121,325	1,194,881,285	1,125,250,832	271,864,121	1,/18,546,4// 1 3/3 077 579	1.669.524.700	1.394.503.000	973,846,876	954,236,519	226,961,354	688,173,035	109.000.000	1,990,469,000	856,215,012	5,283,125,597 2 617 677 700	409.693.640	2,104,931,061	1,053,566,920	631,121,950 1 544 500 000	166 650 A35	909 110 205	207,837,626	1,587,786,604	6,943,348,308	798,346,200	92,686,200	1,780,468,378	1,570,807,000 515.656.320	1,114,018,800	352,669,707
AASC (with	sector enrollment increase AND state-specific tuition	\$69,288,136	Ş	\$74,817,218	\$37,647,434	\$326,210,204	\$63,358,203 \$35,197,834	\$9,071,472	\$228,598,528	\$109,854,846	\$19,228,549 \$17,202,242	¢1/,2U3,243 ¢1/2 100 77/	\$81,726,669	\$74,706,202	\$38,451,223	\$71,027,193	\$60,237,80 1	\$10,836,292 \$00,800,201	290,309,905 295 556 111	\$125,205,081	\$114.104.888	\$42,842,811	\$60,097,306	\$6,034,310	\$20,502,088 \$20,511,152	\$15.221.348	\$139,434,349	\$21,609,885	\$376,929,735 ¢oo 226.005	\$10.085.593	\$166,812,972	\$45,576,764	\$82,286,420 ¢179.011.957	200'TTC'07TC	\$83 677 905	\$12,372,796	\$64,985,445	\$256,290,944	\$27,578,691	\$8,931,103	\$145,062,969	\$142,979,110 \$20.437.556	\$86,982,941	\$10,249,347
	AASC (with state- specific tuition increase)****	\$63,097,796	Ş	\$71,473,440	\$34,699,731	\$315,521,891	\$32,767,148	\$8,106,642	\$219,488,756	\$101,573, 6 48	\$18,397,269 \$15 204 804	¢106 007 570	\$73,270,732	\$71,266,549	\$35,995,281	\$65,773,857	\$54,637,993	\$9,906,889	\$89,058,142	\$115 770 582	\$107.839.106	\$40,904,780	\$55,839,690	\$4,830,793	\$18,990,581 \$10,355,071	\$13.402.192	\$132,259,170	\$20,746,865	\$361,092,005 ¢oo Aof 500	\$8.607.621	\$155,017,125	\$41,821,091	\$77,940,473 ¢115 777 572	610 210 E10	678 456 077	\$10,456,532	\$59,569,846	\$244,026,084	\$23,916,339	\$7,537,457	\$135,333,993	\$138,023,642 \$17.971.250	\$79,593,302	\$9,927,947
	AASC (with simple tuition increase) ***	\$62,444,358	Ş	\$70,842,502	\$33,830,629	\$287,986,941	\$56,1/2,583 \$37,863,138	\$8,062,060	\$221,013,574	\$99,817,974	\$17,922,782 \$14 Een 700	514,080,/U5 5105 220 562	\$72,589,198	\$71,135,098	\$35,863,483	\$65,904,380	\$49,412,129	\$10,149,286 \$25 \$ 17 707	\$80 12/ 571	\$113.756.081	\$110.061.375	\$40,789,392	\$55,501,965	\$4,947,085	\$19,015,767	\$13.812.169	\$133,026,802	\$20,524,216	\$355, 733, 568 ¢ec ann 271	\$8.714.513	\$154,721,176	\$41,203,682	\$77,362,776	004/002/01T¢	\$76 915 344	\$10,210,452	\$58,733,054	\$241,155,904	\$23,748,604	\$7,536,589	\$132,132,024	\$137,268,077 \$17.049.878	\$79,188,039	\$9,822,706
	AASC (with simple sector enrollment increase) **	\$67,226,069	S	\$72,702,709	\$35,984,807	\$291,904,418	\$61,004,721 \$34,608,769	\$8,844,690	\$225,673,169	\$105,839,248	\$18,365,316 \$15,070,041	142,5/2,CL¢	\$79,378,902	\$73,106,280	\$37,559,247	\$69,772,688	\$53,408,178	\$10,883,754 \$20,525 525	\$88,091,298 \$92 275 392	\$120,614,130	\$114,172,822	\$41,884,271	\$58,562,578	\$6,058,406	\$20,126,743 \$20,040,452	\$15.379.387	\$137,493,751	\$20,958,798	\$364,055,170 \$90 966 427	\$10.010.627	\$163,229,905	\$44,023,441	\$80,075,011 ¢121 £70 £00	060'6 /0'T7T¢	\$80 373 240	\$11,844,725	\$62,816,254	\$248,310,301	\$26,848,304	\$8,754,974	\$138,853,740	\$139,408,253 \$19.009.548	\$84,843,189	\$9,941,862
	Additional Annual State Cost (AASC) Estimate*	\$61,219,958	\$	\$69,453,433	\$33,167,283	\$282,340,138	\$55,0/1,160	\$7,903,980	\$216,679,974	\$97,860,758	\$17,571,355	\$14,294,813 \$101 E00 37E	\$71,165,880	\$69,740,292	\$35,160,278	\$64,612,138	\$48,443,263	\$9,950,281	\$83,4/8,144 \$87 386 785	\$111.525.570	\$107.903.308	\$39,989,600	\$54,413,691	\$4,850,083	\$18,642,908 \$46,016,072	\$13.541.343	\$130,418,433	\$20,121,780	\$348,758,400 ¢95 106 202	\$8.543.640	\$151,687,428	\$40,395,767	\$75,845,859 ¢408 TE8 26F	CU2,0C1,0ULÇ	\$75 AD7 200	\$10,010,247	\$57,581,425	\$236,427,357	\$23,282,945	\$7,388,813	\$129,541,200	\$134,576,546 \$16.715.567	\$77,635,333	\$9,630,104
	2015-16 in- district T&F	\$4,310		\$2,480	\$3,400	\$1,420	\$4,080	\$3,570	\$3,230	\$3,650	\$3,660 \$1 070	\$3,8/U ¢2 750	\$4,320	\$4,750	\$2,790	\$4,650	\$3,970	\$3,490	\$4,2/U \$5,620	\$3.510	\$5.390	\$2,590	\$3,190	\$3,250	\$2,890 61 810	\$6.510	\$4,600	\$1,680	\$5,100 ¢1 270	\$4,410	\$4,530	\$3,650	\$4,670 ¢4,000	02010	0/2/t-¢	\$6,140	\$4,100	\$2,360	\$3,570	\$7,530	\$4,800	\$4,150 \$3.800	\$4,470	\$2,810
	4-yr UG FTE (2013)	111,482	18,070	104,815	66, 295	538,833	47.210	21,080	222,742	174,871	17,354	34,/11 127 A00	152,093	56,690	68,788	88,784	100,049	21,398	97,67U 85 2A6	2012-147	93.054	58,523	104,047	29,743	41,075	22,587	123,049	39,858	239,949 161 036	26.612	203,841	79,511	72,448	10,002	270,01	23,902	102,143	402,812	79,896	14,514	155,209	93,141 48.294	129,000	8,876
	2-уг FTE (2013)	56,817	0	112,022	39,020	795,324	31.871	8,856	268,334	107,245	19,204 14 775	C//,PT	65,894	58,729	50,409	55,580	48,809	11,404	/8,200 62 197	127,095	80.077	61,760	68,230	5,969	25,803	8.320	113,407	47,909	273,536	7.749	133,940	44,269	64,964 00 242	00,242	67 839	6,521	56,177	400,724	26,087	3,925	107,951	129,712 17.595	69,472	13,708
	Mecatus index	0.6	8.26	-0.78	-0.66	-1.41	-0.2/	-0.69	2.74	-0.58	-1.08	1 96	0.07	-0.04	-0.48	-1.42	-0.85	-1.15	-0.58	80-	-0.7	-0.78	0.49	0.98	2.75	-0.13	-1.86	-0.92	-1.49	2.97	1.3	66.0	-0.5	+T T-	0.03	2.84	1.1	-0.12	0.95	-1.08	-0.21	-0.43	-0.64	2.67
	Delta subsidy rate 2010	69.9%	85.9%	70.7%	72.0%	87.2%	38.7%	45.6%	66.2%	61.8%	82.8% 55 10/	94T'CD	39.3%	61.1%	73.2%	84.3%	73.2%	69.8%	52 1%	58.1%	49.6%	74,1%	57.7%	63.4%	76.3%	48.3%	39.4%	79.5%	58.8%	60.3%	41.8%	63.3%	63.7% A5 20/	40.270 51 502	41 0%	26.7%	47.4%	67.8%	79.1%	17.5%	56.9%	68.3% 73.6%	78.7%	82.9%
	Delta enrollment estimates 2010	93,927	940	220,669	59,910	1,627,479	59.713	15,728	452,332	188,437	32,438 14 545	200 205	200,200 113,881	99,912	82,333	99,918	68,839	16,276	103 571	256.088	133.216	82,433	103,363	9,349	46,557	0,939	177,795	81,830	322,864	11.210	223,853	79,429	107,147	17 701	49 750	5,871	93,061	701,753	49,167	6,225	192,358	205,957 17.279	130,530	23,170
	State	Alabama	Alaska	Arizona	Arkansas	Califomia	Colorado Connecticut	Delaware	Florida	Georgia	Hawaii	Illinoic	Indiana	lowa	Kansas	Kentucky	Louisiana	Maine	Maryiand Macachiicatte	Michigan	Minnesota	Mississippi	Missouri	Montana	Nebraska	New Hampshire	New Jersey	New Mexico	New York North Carolina	North Dakota	Ohio	Oklahoma	Oregon	Phodo Island	South Carolina	South Dakota	Tennessee	Texas	Utah	Vermont	Virginia	Washington West Virginia	Wisconsin	Wyoming

Appendix 1: Calculating Costs and Budgets

AmericanActionForum.org

RESEARCH



* =	25% share of 2-year college FTE enrollments
**=	Adds assumption that some 4-year students will opt
***=	Adds assumption that states' tuition and fee
	Adds assumption that states' tuition and fee
****_	structures would increase by a simple average of a
=	state's 2-year sector average tuition growth
	documented over the prior 5 years
*****=	AASC estimate assuming sector enrollement increase



so	ME						
COLLE	COLLEGE OR						
STATE ASSOC	IATE'S						
DEG	GREE						
	20,392						
Alaska	8,497						
	54,960						
	12,869						
	83,339						
Colorado	36,807						
Connecticut	9,840						
Delaware	5,637						
District of Columbia	4,103						
Florida 1	20,288						
Georgia	47,947						
Hawaii	13,543						
Idaho	12,751						
Illinois	30,867						
Indiana	25,710						
Iowa	12,437						
Kansas	14,726						
Kentucky	18,953						
Louisiana	16,502						
Maine	7,055						
Maryland	22,373						
	16,525						
	21,296						
	19,225						
	, 12,714						
	, 26,162						
Montana	5,769						
Nebraska	9,419						
	30,806						
New Hampshire	6,680						
	18,368						
	13,085						
	27,682						
	50,129						
North Dakota	7,442						
	29,425						
	19,953						
	29,453						
	28,564						
South Carolina	3,255						
South Dakota	31,145 6 205						
	6,205 32 254						
	32,254						
	96,969 14,093						
	-						
Vermont	2,217						
	39,498						
—	37,772						
West Virginia	7,359						
Wisconsin Wyoming	17,100						
	5,706						

ⁱ Last dollar here describes programs where the amount awarded isn't determined until all other grants and scholarships have been accounted for.

ⁱⁱ Source: http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d13/tables/dt13_303.10.asp and http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d13/tables/dt13_303.25.asp

ⁱⁱⁱ Calculations are based on Table 20a from the U.S. Department of Education's *2012-2013 Federal Pell Grant Program End-of-Year Report*. http://www2.ed.gov/finaid/prof/resources/data/pell-2012-13/pell-eoy-2012-13.html

^{iv} Similar rates at 4-year public and private institutions are 20.1 percent and 17.1 percent respectively. Source: The Delta Cost Project's *Institutional Costs of Student Attrition*. Table #2. September 2012 http://www.deltacostproject.org/sites/default/files/products/Delta-Cost-Attrition-Research-Paper.pdf

^v Source: http://www2.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/defaultmanagement/schooltyperates.pdf ^{vi} A core challenge to developing reliable cost estimates is that, at any given time, the most recent state-, school- and student-based data typically captures a number of different years. The estimates provided here face the same constraint though the divergence only spans approximately three calendar years. Rather than normalize and report "old" data, we have opted to instead utilize the most recent data available for each data type on the assumption that incremental, year-on-year changes have not been so dramatic as to significantly alter the spirit or purpose of the estimates being provided.

^{vii} Cost estimates are based on the FTE enrollment levels and average tuition and fee data provided by the College Board's *Trends in College Pricing 2015*.

http://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/trends-college-pricing-web-final-508-2.pdf ^{viii} Assumes a two percent tuition and fee increase and an increase in a state's community college population that equates to a 5 percent shift of a state's existing public 4-year population. ^{ix} Source: Illinois State University College of Education Grapevine 2014 data (Table 1).

http://education.illinoisstate.edu/grapevine/tables/

* Source: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. http://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-andtax/years-of-cuts-threaten-to-put-college-out-of-reach-for-more-students

xⁱ Source: https://www.multistate.com/insider/2015/01/a-look-at-states-facing-budget-deficits-in-2015/

^{xii} More information about the Mercatus rankings can be found here:

http://mercatus.org/statefiscalrankings

xiii The other program that the GAO identified as part of their research was the Leveraging Educational Assistance Partnerships (LEAP) program. The report also mentions the GEAR UP program. However that program is designed more towards assisting a wider array of educational partners than just colleges or towards colleges' abilities to reduce costs. Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office report, *Higher Education: State Funding Trends and Policies on Affordability*. http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/667557.pdf

xiv According to the National Center for Education Statistics, 6-year graduate rates for undergraduates are less than 60 percent nationally while the equivalent metric for students at 2-year colleges is only about 30 percent.

^{xv} See, for example, Judith Scott Clayton and Thomas Bailey's piece from January, 2015: "The Problem with Obama's 'Free Community College' Proposal." http://time.com/money/3674033/obama-free-college-plan-problems/

^{xvi} Shapiro, D., Dundar, A., Yuan, X., Harrell, A. & Wakhungu, P.K. (2014, November). Completing College: A National View of Student Attainment Rates – Fall 2008 Cohort (Signature Report No. 8). Herndon, VA: National Student Clearinghouse Research Center.

^{xvii} Source: The American Institutes for Research 2011 report, *The Hidden Costs of Community Colleges*.

http://www.air.org/sites/default/files/downloads/report/AIR_Hidden_Costs_of_Community_Colleg es_Oct2011_0.pdf.



^{xviii} To get a better understanding of the challenges to state-based efforts at promoting university funding equality, look at the National Science Foundation's *Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research* (EPSCoR), which was designed to redress the concentration of federal research dollars in a relatively small number of universities at the expense of many flagship institutions in the central part of the United States. More information can be found here: http://www.nsf.gov/od/oia/programs/epscor/2030%20Report.pdf