Executive Summary

• Despite decades of warnings regarding Social Security’s looming insolvency, Congress has failed to enact comprehensive reform, largely due to political concerns; yet amid urgent warnings, leaders in Congress have introduced two bipartisan bills – one in the House, and one in the Senate – to change the process through which Social Security reform would be developed and considered.
• The two bills represent different approaches to congressional delegation; the Senate’s Protecting Retirement Opportunities and Maintaining Income Security for Everyone Act would rely on the existing Social Security Advisory Board and preserve Congress’ ability to amend legislation, while the House’s Bipartisan Social Security Commission Act would establish a temporary commission whose recommendations would receive expedited legislative consideration with no opportunity for congressional amendments.
• While procedural reforms could encourage bipartisan negotiations and reduce legislative barriers, they cannot eliminate the difficult policy tradeoffs inherent in Social Security reform; Congress and the White House must be willing to both accept a political compromise and to endorse a combination of tax increases and benefit cuts that may be highly unpopular with voters.

Introduction

For decades, the Social Security Trustees have warned that Social Security is approaching insolvency. Their latest projections estimate the combined Social Security trust funds (Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) and Disability Insurance (SSDI)) will be insolvent by the end of calendar year 2034 – just eight years from now. Despite these urgent warnings, Congress has failed to reform the program since 1983, nearly a half-century ago. While lawmakers have put forth numerous proposals over the years to improve Social Security’s finances, political concerns have proven a seemingly insurmountable obstacle to adopting program changes. This decades-long delay has, regrettably, left the reform options both abrupt and relatively sharp.

The warning’s growing urgency, has, however, spurred leaders in Congress to introduce two bipartisan bills – one in the House, and one in the Senate – to change the process through which Social Security reform would be developed and considered.

In the House, Representatives Tom Cole (R-OK) and Tom Suozzi (D-NY) have introduced the Bipartisan Social Security Commission Act of 2026 (HR 9187). In the Senate, Senators Bill Cassidy (R-LA), Dick Durbin (D-IL), Thom Tillis (R-NC), Tim Kaine (D-VA), John Cornyn (R-TX), Angus King (I-ME), and Alan Armstrong (R-OK) have introduced the Protecting Retirement Opportunities and Maintaining Income Security for Everyone (PROMISE) Act of 2026 (S 4979). Each bill would establish a process to develop recommendations for Congress, with the goal of encouraging bipartisan negotiations and creating a structured path toward legislative action on Social Security reform legislation. The  bills differ in design, yet both rest on the idea that institutional and process reforms can help overcome the political barriers that have long impeded action on Social Security.

Whether changing the legislative process increases the likelihood of reforms is an open question. While commissions may facilitate bipartisan negotiations and reduce some political issues, they cannot eliminate the difficult policy tradeoffs inherent in restoring Social Security solvency.

Why Change the Process?

Most lawmakers inherently understand that Social Security reform is inevitable, yet there is no consensus on when Congress should act or how the costs of restoring long-term solvency should be distributed. Although Congress has successfully enacted major Social Security reforms before, doing so requires a bipartisan process. The National Commission on Social Security Reform (the Greenspan Commission) helped forge the bipartisan compromise that became the Social Security Amendments of 1983. The success of the Greenspan Commission demonstrates that institutional mechanisms can facilitate bipartisan agreement on politically difficult issues.

Social Security’s financial challenge has been anticipated for decades. Since 1985, the Social Security Trustees have consistently warned that absent legislative action, the trust funds would eventually be depleted. Although the projected depletion date has shifted over time as economic and demographic assumptions changed, for much of the past four decades the trustees have projected depletion in the early-to-mid 2030s. These recurring warnings demonstrate that Social Security’s financial challenge has been well understood for decades and has long required congressional action.

Despite these longstanding warnings, the traditional legislative process is not well-suited for producing a comprehensive Social Security reform package. Members often have incentives to support individual policies while opposing the broader compromise needed to restore solvency. Moreover, Social Security reform cannot be done through budget reconciliation, which allows legislation to pass the Senate by a simple majority vote. The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 prohibits any budget reconciliation legislation from changing Social Security’s benefit structure, trust funds, or dedicated funding mechanisms, requiring any comprehensive reform to proceed through the regular legislative process and overcome the Senate’s 60-vote cloture threshold.

These institutional barriers are compounded by decades of legislative inaction. Since lawmakers have repeatedly delayed reforms while Social Security’s financial imbalance has grown, restoring long-term solvency will almost certainly require both revenue and benefit changes. Earlier action would have allowed Congress to phase in smaller, more gradual changes. Now, the options are more limited, and any viable reform package will likely impose costs on both current and future workers and beneficiaries. The central political challenge is therefore not whether difficult choices must be made, but how those unavoidable costs should be distributed.

The challenge is further compounded by the complexity of Social Security reform. The program’s financing and benefit structures are highly interconnected, meaning changes to one component will inevitably affect others. As a result, comprehensive reform cannot be achieved by considering individual proposals in isolation. Lawmakers must negotiate a comprehensive package of benefit and revenue changes.

Institutional reforms could address this challenge by changing the way Social Security reform would be developed and considered. Such changes could create a clear and structured process to evaluate policy options, establish deadlines for congressional action, and combine multiple reforms into a single legislative package. While changing the process cannot eliminate the difficult tradeoffs inherent in Social Security reform, it could improve Congress’ ability to negotiate and act on comprehensive legislation.

Two Different Institutional Approaches

The PROMISE Act and the Bipartisan Social Security Commission Act both aim to facilitate Social Security reform by changing the legislative process by which reform could be enacted, albeit in different ways.

The PROMISE Act: Building on an Existing Institution

The PROMISE Act would direct the bipartisan Social Security Advisory Board (SSAB) to develop a comprehensive proposal to restore solvency to the OASI and SSDI trust funds for at least 50 years, certified by the Social Security Trustees. The proposal would then be submitted to Congress as a “base bill” for legislative consideration.

To ensure Congress acts on SSAB’s proposal, the PROMISE Act would establish expedited procedures for legislative consideration. It would direct the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader to introduce the base bill, though any Member of Congress could do so if leadership declines. The legislation would then be referred to the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee, which would have the chance to hold hearings and amend the base bill. They would have a set timeframe to report the bill (as potentially amended). If either committee fails to act within that period, the bill would be automatically discharged and placed on the House and Senate legislative calendars.

The Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader would move to proceed to the base bill, though any member could make a motion to proceed if leadership declines. Debate on the base bill would be limited to 100 hours in each chamber, divided equally between the majority and the minority. During floor consideration, members would have the opportunity to offer substitute amendments to the base bill. Any amendment would need to ensure that the OASI and SSDI trust funds are solvent for at least the next 50 years, and the adoption of an amendment would require a simple majority in the House and a three-fifths majority in the Senate.  Once the 100 hours of debate concludes, Congress would vote on final passage of the bill (as potentially amended). A simple majority vote in the House and a three-fifths vote in the Senate would be required for passage.

The Bipartisan Social Security Commission Act: Creating a Temporary Negotiating Body

The Bipartisan Social Security Commission Act would establish a Commission on Long-Term Social Security Solvency to develop bipartisan recommendations and legislation to restore solvency to the OASI and SSDI trust funds for at least the next 75 years. The commission would be comprised of 13 members. One member would be appointed by the President of the United States, two by each of the Speaker of the House, the House Minority Leader, the Senate Majority Leader, and the Senate Minority Leader. One member would also be appointed by each of the House Ways and Means Committee Chairman and Ranking Member, and Senate Finance Committee Chairman and Ranking Member. Of the 12 members appointed by Congress, at least one appointed by each political party must be an expert. The appointed by the President would serve as the chair of the commission while one of the Speaker of the House’s appointees would serve as the co-chair. Within one year of its first meeting, the commission would be required to approve its recommendations – by an affirmative vote of at least nine of its members – before submitting them to Congress.

Once the recommendations are received, Congress would be able to consider them under expedited procedures. Within three legislative days of receiving the commission’s report, the Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader would be required to introduce an “approval bill” consisting of the commission’s recommendations. The bill would then be referred to the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee, which would have three legislative days to report the bill (no amendments would be allowed). If either committee fails to act within that period, the bill would be automatically discharged and placed on the House and Senate legislative calendars.

The Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader would move to proceed with the approval bill. Debate on the bill would be limited to four hours in the House and 30 hours in the Senate, split evenly between the majority and the minority. Once the specified hours of debate conclude, Congress would vote on final passage of the approval bill. A simple majority vote in the House and a three-fifths vote in the Senate would be required for passage.

Comparing Two Proposals for Delegation

While both the PROMISE Act and the Bipartisan Social Security Commission Act aim to facilitate Social Security reform through procedural changes, they represent different forms of congressional delegation.

The PROMISE Act would delegate the development of a legislative package to an existing advisory entity but preserve Congress’ ability to amend the bill. The House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee would have a period to review, amend, and report the legislation and each chamber would have ample time to debate and amend the bill on the floor. The PROMISE Act therefore represents an attempt to balance expedited legislative consideration with congressional ownership of the policy outcome.

In contrast, the Bipartisan Social Security Commission Act would delegate the development of recommendations to a temporary bipartisan commission and prohibit congressional amendments to the recommendations. The House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee would have a very short window to review – not debate or amend – and report the legislation and each chamber would have limited time to debate the bill on the floor. This expedited, amendment-free process is similar to the procedures used by the Base Realignment and Closure process – which was used in 1988,1991, 1993, 1995, and 2005 to dispose of excess military infrastructure – that submitted recommendations to Congress for an up-or-down vote without amendment. The Bipartisan Social Security Commission Act therefore places greater emphasis on reaching bipartisan consensus before legislation reaches Congress.

The Bipartisan Social Security Commission Act’s expedited procedures are considerably more restrictive than the PROMISE Act’s. The former would prohibit amendments, give committees a short window to report the bill, and limit floor debate to while the latter would permit amendments in committee and on the floor and allow 100 hours of floor debate in each chamber. The bills also differ in their solvency objectives. The PROMISE Act would require a legislative package that restores solvency for at least 50 years, while the Bipartisan Social Security Commission Act would require a 75-year solvency package.

Can Process Reform Overcome Political Incentives?

The PROMISE Act and the Bipartisan Social Security Commission Act both rest on the idea that institutional reforms can help overcome the political barriers that have long impeded Social Security reform. Their structured negotiations, mandatory deadlines, and expedited procedures would reduce legislative delays and force lawmakers to consider comprehensive Social Security reform packages rather than isolated policy changes.

Whether process reforms are sufficient is an open question. Neither bill would eliminate the difficult choices associated with Social Security reform. The same debate over taxes, benefits, retirement age, and program design would remain regardless of whether recommendations come from the SSAB or a temporary bipartisan commission.

Commissions can facilitate negotiation, not consensus. Their success is contingent on lawmakers’ willingness to accept the tradeoffs necessary to enact comprehensive reform.