Insight
November 20, 2026
Looking Ahead to Regulatory Policy in the 120th Congress
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The incoming congressional Democratic majorities will likely be motivated to employ the Congressional Review Act (CRA) to highlight their political disapproval of Trump Administration rulemakings.
- Under the CRA, lawmakers will be able to force filibuster-proof votes of Trump Administration actions finalized from June 2026 onward, including notable rules on environmental standards, immigration enforcement, and labor policy; these votes are unlikely to produce substantive changes, however, given the president’s ability to veto CRA resolutions.
- While these CRA votes may be the most prominent legislative actions on regulatory policy issues in 120th Congress, concerns from Democratic lawmakers over how the Trump Administration utilizes executive actions may spur interest in some broader reform measures.
INTRODUCTION
The incoming congressional Democratic majorities will likely be motivated to employ the Congressional Review Act (CRA) to highlight their political disapproval of Trump Administration rulemakings to force filibuster-proof votes of Trump Administration actions finalized from June 2026 onward. These votes are unlikely to produce substantive changes, however, given the president’s ability to veto CRA resolutions. Thus, most of the action on the regulatory policy front will remain with the executive branch as the Trump Administration continues its broadly deregulatory agenda. While the prospects of substantive policy changes on the legislative side are relatively slim. The chances for political action on such items, however, will be quite high – thanks primarily to what may soon be congressional Democrats’ new favorite regulatory policy lever: the CRA.
CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT
While the incoming Congress will see significant Democratic majorities in both chambers, the 60-vote cloture requirement in the Senate will remain a key impediment to most legislative action. The CRA, however, will provide Senate Democrats one of the few avenues to bypass that threshold. As the America Action Forum (AAF) has previously noted:
One of the most unique aspects of the CRA is that – for a limited window – the Senate can take up these resolutions under an expedited process, bypassing the usual filibuster threshold of 60 votes and passing a resolution of disapproval by a simple majority. If a resolution of disapproval pertaining to a rule is passed by both chambers of Congress and signed by the president, the rule becomes void and the agency that issued the rule cannot issue a rule in “substantially the same form” in the future unless subsequently and specifically authorized by Congress.
Granted, there is virtually no expectation that President Trump will sign a resolution into law that rescinds one of his administration’s own rulemakings – nor, for that matter, is there any great likelihood for veto-proof majorities in the offing. Nevertheless, being able to advance such resolutions to the White House and forcing a presidential veto will make CRA resolutions a potent political messaging option for Democratic lawmakers.
The CRA has, for good reason, generally been more associated with Republican administrations and lawmakers. The start of both Trump terms saw the most successful usage of the law since its inception as a part of the broader Trump-era deregulatory efforts. CRA usage under Democratic control of the White House and Congress is hardly unprecedented, however. The early months of the Biden Administration had three successful CRA resolutions overturning Trump-era rules. Furthermore, as is clear from AAF’s tracking: out of the 148 CRA resolutions of disapproval introduced during this current Congress, 88 have been brought by Democratic lawmakers against Trump Administration actions (or roughly 60 percent). As such, whatever historical aversion Democrats have had to utilizing the CRA has all but diminished.
One can expect that many of the rules Democrats will target in the 120th Congress will be those that the Trump Administration finalizes on a rolling basis from 2027 onward. Another key aspect of the CRA – the “look-back” window, under which “final rules posted within the last 60 legislative days of the preceding Congress are open to review under the law’s expedited process” – will also allow them to bring votes on some rules finalized in 2026. The precise 60-day window is unknowable until the current Congress adjourns sine die, but using both the planned calendar and the days in session calendar, the cut-off point will likely fall sometime in early June 2026.
While it is difficult to predict exactly which rules from this year the next Congress will focus on, the following table includes rules recorded in AAF’s RegRodeo database that one could expect the incoming Democratic majorities to zero in on due to some combination of the rule’s significance and/or the political salience of the subject matter.
Again, the above rules are merely a small, yet notable, sample of potential CRA targets. It is important to remember that the CRA’s definition of “rule” expands beyond typical notice-and-comment rulemakings and includes such items as “guidance documents,” which may be impactful despite not being subject to the usual rulemaking process. Multiple items in AAF’s current CRA Tracker fall into that category (such as this Small Business Administration “notice” on the immigration status of small business loan applicants). One could expect future guidance documents to continue to be targeted.
There has also been some interest from lawmakers in utilizing the CRA to overturn the Trump Administration’s tariffs. As the Congressional Research Service explains here:
In 2026, some Members of Congress asked GAO whether different tariff actions should have been submitted to Congress and subject to CRA review. In June 2026, GAO issued an opinion concluding that a Department of Commerce report supporting the President’s imposition of copper tariffs under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 was not a rule for purposes of the CRA. Section 232 grants the President authority to decide what action, if any, to take to “adjust the imports” of specific goods if Commerce submits a report finding that those imports threaten national security. GAO determined that the Commerce report did not itself prescribe law or policy, reasoning that it “merely outlined findings and proposed actions for the President to evaluate as final decisionmaker.” Unlike Section 232, Section 301 charges the agency itself (USTR) with determining import restrictions, albeit “subject to the specific direction, if any, of the President.” A different analysis, therefore, might govern final Section 301 actions.
Given this determination of Section 232 tariffs’ inapplicability and the uncertainty surrounding that of other tariff categories, the incoming Congress may focus more on implementing structural changes to the president’s tariff authority instead of trying to address each tariff piecemeal with the CRA.
OTHER POTENTIAL REFORM POLICIES
Given the dynamic of divided government and the limitation of the 60-vote threshold for most legislation in the Senate, any substantive legislation emerging from the 120th Congress will either come in the form of “must-pass” bills or as the result of some novel bipartisan coalition. Also, despite their renewed interest in the CRA, Democratic lawmakers have generally been opposed to bills seeking to significantly change the regulatory process. The outlook for consequential legislation on this front is quite dim. There are, however, a couple of areas here where certain members – especially Democrats freshly elected in otherwise Republican-leaning districts or states seeking to stake out some bipartisan bona fides – may be willing to engage.
As noted above, guidance documents and other agency actions that fall outside of the typical rulemaking process will be one area the incoming Congress will likely want to address. While the 120th Congress may utilize the CRA to repeal individual actions one-by-one, it may behoove lawmakers to come up with broader reforms of such practices. One recent example of legislation on this topic has been the “Guidance Out of Darkness Act” (GOOD) Act, which would require agencies to more transparently catalogue these sub-regulatory actions and policies that do not regularly appear in the Federal Register. Such a bill does little to actually constrain the practice of policymaking via guidance documents. Rather, it would make such policies more readily available to the public at large, presumably drawing greater attention to otherwise opaque and obscure items. Incoming members may find some appeal in such a framework.
Another area that may hold some glimmer of cross-partisan lawmaking potential is the issue of administrative burdens. A policy proposal AAF has long heralded on this front is the concept of a “paperwork budget” explained here:
The core premise of such a program is not dissimilar from the broader “regulatory budget” framework in which agencies and the government writ large set certain policy targets for what the “limit” on new burdens will be and then go about balancing out the burdens involved with new requirements versus savings from eliminating, consolidating, or streamlining old requirements. It is more practical than an overall regulatory budget in that the data are already available in a measurable form, thus avoiding some of the methodological issues with trying to establish “baseline costs” under a regulatory budget. While a paperwork budget would have less of an economic impact than a broader regulatory budget, it would be less politically contentious as it would largely avoid wading into issues of agency regulatory authority.
Democratic lawmakers wary of making more substantial changes to agency rulemaking authority may find some appeal in this more modest reform posture.
Additionally, Trump Administration actions may provoke renewed interest in Congress having some way of checking executive branch actions on such issues. For instance, the Department of Agriculture (USDA) recently published a proposed rule that seeks to make significant changes to Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefit eligibility criteria. The main purpose of the proposal is to reduce overall SNAP benefit outlays, but an ancillary aspect is that its updated compliance regime will involve more than 14 million hours of new paperwork each year. Under a paperwork budget framework, Congress could potentially be empowered to either restrain an agency such as USDA from proposing such a policy in the first place because of the sizable administrative burdens involved or force the agency to at least find commensurate paperwork burdens to cut alongside such a rulemaking.
CONCLUSION
For the next two years, the locus of regulatory policy will remain in the executive branch with the Trump Administration implementing its regulatory budget program. While there is a faint chance of changes at the margins, the coming divided government dynamic significantly reduces the likelihood of any legislation with a real impact on the rulemaking process passing into law. Despite the limited potential for substantive legislative changes, the Trump Administration’s executive actions will remain live political issues. Political messaging will be the name of the game, and one can expect that, with the CRA in hand, the new Democratic majorities will hold plenty of votes on these actions.





