Insight
September 24, 2025
Medicare Advantage, Fee-for-Service, and the Value of Competition
Executive Summary
- Rising premiums are a reminder that the most efficient Medicare model is one that blends access and affordability with market discipline – Medicare Advantage.
- The structure of Medicare Advantage mirrors many of the strengths of the employer-sponsored insurance market, long the backbone of U.S. health coverage; this model is preferred by more than half of Medicare enrollees.
- The growth in Medicare Advantage enrollment signals a broader shift in U.S. health policy preference and a recognition that competition can harness private innovation for public goals.
Introduction
Rising premiums have once again ignited calls for sweeping reforms, with advocates of “Medicare for All” arguing that a single-payer system (e.g. enrolling everyone in Medicare fee-for-service) could save the United States as much as $650 billion annually. These claims may resonate with the public in an era of escalating costs, but they also obscure a critical reality. The most preferred model of Medicare is the one that blends access with private-market characteristics: Medicare Advantage (MA). Unlike traditional Medicare fee-for-service (FFS), which relies on administered prices and fragmented billing, MA harnesses competition among private plans to control costs, expand benefits, and protect seniors financially.
For much of its history, Medicare was a single, government-administered insurance program: FFS. That framework has guaranteed access for millions of seniors, but it has also been criticized for rewarding volume over value, leaving beneficiaries exposed to unlimited out-of-pocket costs, and offering little incentive for coordination or innovation. By contrast, MA injects private competition into Medicare. The structure of MA mirrors many of the strengths of the employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) market, long the backbone of U.S. private health coverage. Instead of paying each provider separately, MA replicates this group-market dynamic for seniors. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) serves as the sponsor, setting ground rules, adjusting for risk, and publishing performance data. Plans then compete against one another by submitting bids against a government-set benchmark tied to local FFS costs. If a plan bids lower than the benchmark, it receives a rebate, which must be returned to enrollees in the form of reduced premiums or supplemental benefits. This bid-benchmark-rebate system has become the economic engine of MA, and it explains why more than half of Medicare beneficiaries – about 54 percent in 2025 – have chosen MA over FFS.
The rise of MA is not just a shift in enrollment numbers. It represents a deeper change in how Medicare finances and delivers care from a static, centrally priced entitlement to a more efficient managed-competition marketplace that disciplines costs, incentivizes quality, and expands benefits.
The Merits of Medicare Advantage: Value Through Competition
At the heart of MA is competition, a feature largely absent from FFS. In FFS, payment rates are administered by CMS rulemaking and updated annually. The structure offers little room for consumers to compare products, and providers face few competitive checks on price or quality. MA, by contrast, creates a market where plans compete to offer the most value.
Price discipline and efficiency
When CMS sets benchmarks, plans respond with competitive bids. Evidence shows that for each $1 increase in the benchmark, bids rise by only about 53 cents, indicating plans do not simply pocket the full margin but calibrate bids competitively. This responsiveness to market signals contrasts sharply with FFS, where administered rates are insensitive to efficiency gains.
Rebates flow to consumers
Because most MA plans bid below their benchmarks, rebates are common. By law, rebates must be used to reduce premiums or enhance benefits. This is why seniors in MA frequently enjoy $0 plan premiums, bundled prescription drug coverage, and extras such as dental, vision, hearing, transportation, or fitness memberships. In effect, efficiency gains are monetized for beneficiaries, a dynamic missing in FFS.
Quality-based rivalry
The Star Ratings system ties extra payments to measured performance, including preventive screenings, hospital readmissions, and patient experience. High-quality plans receive bonuses they can return to enrollees through better benefits, driving a competitive cycle of quality improvement. FFS, by contrast, remains a pay-per-service system with only limited quality incentives layered on top.
Countervailing power against providers
MA plans can design networks, selectively contract, and negotiate prices. In concentrated hospital markets, this purchasing power counters provider leverage, lowering unit prices and reducing low-value utilization. FFS cannot steer patients or negotiate in the same way, because it pays every qualified provider according to a fixed schedule.
Prevention and chronic care management
Capitation aligns incentives with prevention: If an enrollee avoids complications, the plan benefits financially. MA plans therefore invest in care coordinators, disease management, and home-based support. In FFS, by contrast, preventing admissions often reduces provider revenue, muting the incentive for early intervention.
Lessons From Employer-sponsored Insurance
The structure of MA mirrors many of the strengths of the employer-sponsored insurance market, long the backbone of U.S. private health coverage. In ESI, workers typically choose among competing health plans, with employers acting as market sponsors. Plans differentiate themselves on premiums, networks, and supplemental offerings, while competing on price and quality.
MA replicates this logic for seniors: CMS serves as the sponsor, setting ground rules, adjusting for risk, and publishing performance data. Beneficiaries choose among competing plans that package hospital, physician, and often drug coverage into a single product. Just as ESI has historically been credited with fostering innovation and managing costs better than government programs, MA channels competitive pressure into consumer-facing value.
Moreover, the bid-benchmark-rebate system functions similarly to how employers leverage competition among insurers to secure better deals for workers. Seniors, like employees, benefit from economies of scale and plan innovation, while insurers must prove value to maintain enrollment. It is no coincidence that many of the same insurers dominate both markets; they bring lessons from ESI into Medicare, adapting benefit design and care management tools for older populations.
A Brief Contrast With Fee-for-Service and Single Payer
As noted at the start, concern with health insurance affordability has spurred renewed discussion for potential alternatives, such as implementation of a single-payer system. Advocates for single payer often argue this would be as easy as enrolling every American into Medicare FFS. Thus, it is tempting to equate Medicare FFS with a single-payer model and use it as the basis of a Medicare for All insurance model, but they differ in certain respects. FFS is not truly single payer in the sense of Canada or the United Kingdom; instead, it is a public option for a subpopulation with fragmented administered prices and little purchasing leverage. Beneficiaries face no annual out-of-pocket maximum, unless they buy supplemental Medigap coverage.
Single-payer systems, by contrast, consolidate financing and control costs through global budgets and monopsony purchasing. These tools – though prohibitively expensive and largely without impact on health outcomes – can stabilize expenditures but often at the expense of consumer choice and price discovery. Medicare Advantage represents the appropriate middle path: government sponsorship ensures universal eligibility and risk adjustment, while competition among private plans introduces market discovery, product differentiation, and continuous innovation.
The Promise for Seniors
Migration toward MA has profound implications for the well-being of seniors. By embedding an annual out-of-pocket maximum, MA provides a safety net against catastrophic medical bills (something FFS lacks). By rebating efficiency gains into supplemental benefits, it offers services that improve quality of life, from eyeglasses to dental care to transportation. By rewarding quality and prevention, it encourages investments that help seniors live healthier, more independent lives.
Most importantly, the structure empowers consumer choice. Seniors can evaluate competing plans on price, benefits, and quality ratings, and their enrollment decisions shape the evolution of the market. The steady rise of MA enrollment – more than doubling in the past 15 years – demonstrates that seniors value the flexibility and financial security the program offers.
To be sure, challenges within the MA program remain. Policymakers continue to debate how to calibrate risk adjustment, refine star ratings, and ensure payment accuracy. But MA’s underlying framework has shown it can deliver more benefits per dollar than FFS, while avoiding some of the trade-offs inherent in global-budget single-payer systems.
Conclusion
The growth of Medicare Advantage signals a broader shift in U.S. health policy: a recognition that competition can harness private innovation for public goals. By bidding against benchmarks, passing rebates to consumers, and competing on quality, MA transforms Medicare from a static payer into a dynamic marketplace. Its parallels with the employer-sponsored insurance system demonstrate that competition can work across age groups, aligning incentives to deliver value. As seniors continue to migrate toward MA, the promise is clear. A Medicare program that not only pays for care but also organizes, coordinates, and improves it, ensuring that older Americans receive better benefits, stronger protections, and healthier lives.





